千葉 早織
   所属   京都産業大学  経済学部 経済学科
   職種   准教授
発表年月日 2023/08/11
発表テーマ Sequential Voting and Forward Herding
会議名 Summer Workshop on Economic Theory
主催者 Summer Workshop on Economic Theory
学会区分 研究会・シンポジウム等
発表形式 口頭(一般)
単独共同区分 単独
開催地名 小樽
開催期間 2023/08/07~2023/08/12
概要 Abstract Imperfectly informed agents publicly and sequentially cast a vote for either of two alternatives. We investigate situations where pieces of their private information are correlated to one another and different in precisions. We find that even though the agents share the common interest, there always exists an equilibrium involving forward herding such that an agent chooses the same vote as the previously casted vote unless she has a very informative signal (a strong signal). There can also exist an equilibrium involving sincere (naive) voting such that an agent chooses her vote based on her private information, independently of past votes. Further, the forward herding can be more efficient than the sincere voting under some conditions regard to signal distributions. Relatedly, contrary to implications by Dekel and Piccione (2002) which focused on independent signals, sequential voting can be more efficient than simultaneous voting in aggregating information in group decisions.