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オダ ヒデノリ
ODA HIDENORI
小田 秀典 所属 京都産業大学 経済学部 経済学科 職種 教授 |
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| 言語種別 | 英語 |
| 発行・発表の年月 | 2014/08 |
| 形態種別 | 研究論文 |
| 査読 | 査読あり |
| 標題 | Effect of Matching Mechanism on Learning in Games Played Under Limited Information |
| 執筆形態 | その他 |
| 掲載誌名 | Pacific Economic Review |
| 出版社・発行元 | WILEY |
| 巻・号・頁 | 19(3),pp.260-277 |
| 著者・共著者 | Nick Feltovich,Sobei H. Oda |
| 概要 | We examine the effect of the matching mechanism on learning in 2×2 games. Six games are played repeatedly under either fixed pairs or random matching. Unlike most economics experiments, the games are played under limited information: subjects are never shown the games' payoff matrices nor given information about opponent payoffs. We find that behaviour, while initially similar between treatments, diverges over time. In most but not all games, fixed-pairs matching is associated with increased coordination on pure-strategy Nash equilibria, higher-payoff equilibria being reached and faster convergence toward pure-strategy play. © 2014 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd. |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0106.12065 |
| ISSN | 1361-374X/1468-0106 |