|
オダ ヒデノリ
ODA HIDENORI
小田 秀典 所属 京都産業大学 経済学部 経済学科 職種 教授 |
|
| 発行・発表の年月 | 2005 |
| 形態種別 | 論文集（書籍）内論文 |
| 査読 | 査読あり |
| 標題 | Price competition between middlemen: An experimental study |
| 執筆形態 | その他 |
| 掲載誌名 | Gaming, Simulations and Society: Research Scope and Perspective |
| 巻・号・頁 | 59-68頁 |
| 著者・共著者 | Kazuhito Ogawa,Kouhei Iyori,Sobei H. Oda |
| 概要 | Recent studies of experimental price competition focus on the number of competitors. For instance, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) examined whether the equilibrium price is attained when the number of competitors is two, three, and four. In these experiments, the subjects knew the supply-demand condition and the number of rounds, and offer ask prices. They are matched randomly in each round. Their result showed that the price does not converge to the competitive one when the number of competitors is two, and that as it increases, the average price approaches the competitive level. Abbink and Brandts (2002) conducted similar experiments and attained similar results. However, Dufwenberg et al. (2002) examined the relation between the price floor (the minimum price) and the price competition. The number of competitors was two. They found that the average price without the price floor is higher than the average price with the price floor. The competition under the price floor treatment is keen because profit can still be made by bidding the minimum price at worst. In our study, we examined how the bid-ask competition influenced the price setting. Does the bid-ask competition increase the ratio of the competitively priced pairs? The number of competitors was two and our study was in line with that of Dufwenberg et al. (2002).We designed the experiment based on the work of Spulber (1999), which dealt with the price competition between middlemen. In this study, middlemen set a bid price, buy a commodity from a supplier, and then sell it to a buyer at a higher ask price. Our results are as follows: in the final rounds, about 30% and 20% of the pairs chose the competitive alternatives under Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, respectively (see following). © 2005 Springer-Verlag Tokyo. |
| DOI | 10.1007/4-431-26797-2_7 |