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Saori CHIBA
千葉 早織 所属 京都産業大学 経済学部 経済学科 職種 准教授 |
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| 言語種別 | 英語 |
| 発行・発表の年月 | 2023/11 |
| 形態種別 | 研究論文 |
| 査読 | 査読あり |
| 標題 | Countervailing Conflicts of Interest in Delegation Games |
| 執筆形態 | 共著 |
| 掲載誌名 | Games |
| 掲載区分 | 国外 |
| 出版社・発行元 | MDPI |
| 巻・号・頁 | 14(6-71),pp.1-20 |
| 総ページ数 | 20 |
| 担当範囲 | All steps |
| 担当区分 | 筆頭著者 |
| 国際共著 | 国際共著 |
| 著者・共著者 | Kaiwen Leong, Economic Growth Center, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore) and Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith University (Australia) |
| 概要 | In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in the context of principal–agent problems. We introduce two dimensions of conflict of interest—pandering incentives related to the outside option and project biases. We compare three delegation mechanisms: full delegation, veto-based delegation, and communication (no delegation). Contrary to conventional one-dimensional conflict models, our findings reveal a non-monotonic relationship between pandering incentives and bias. These conflicts counterbalance each other, resulting in a principal’s benefit from delegation not strictly decreasing with increased bias. Surprisingly, delegation to a biased agent can be advantageous in certain scenarios. This research sheds light on the complex dynamics of delegation mechanisms when confronted with countervailing conflicts of interest, offering insights into decision-making in principal–agent relationships. |
| researchmap用URL | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/6/71 |